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MERGENS V. WESTSIDE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS AT TWENTY-
FIVE AND CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V. MARTINEZ: FROM 
LIVE AND LET LIVE TO MY WAY OR THE HIGHWAY? 
Charles J. Russo, M.Div., J.D., Ed.D.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Congress passed the Equal Access Act (EAA)1 
and forwarded it to President Ronald W. Reagan, who signed it into law 
on August 11, 1984.2 The EAA was enacted in response to Widmar v. 
Vincent,3 a 1980 Supreme Court case from higher education where the 
Justices ushered in a renaissance of sorts in religious liberty. In Widmar, 
treating religious expression as a subset of free speech,4 the Court ruled 
that officials at a state university in Missouri could not deny a Christian 
group access to institutional facilities so long as the university permitted 
 
* B.A., 1972, St. John’s University; M. Div., 1978, Seminary of the Immaculate Conception; J.D., 
1983, St. John’s University; Ed.D., 1989, St. John’s University; Panzer Chair in Education, Director, 
Ph.D. Program in Educational Leadership, and Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Dayton 
(UD). I would like to extend my appreciation to Dr. Ralph Sharp, Associate Professor Emeritus, East 
Central University in Ada, Oklahoma, Dr. David Dolph, Chair, Department of Educational Leader-
ship at the University of Dayton, and Mr. Dwayne Huggins, University of Dayton School of Law, 
Class of 2016, for their useful comments on drafts of the manuscript. I would also like to thank Ms. 
Elizabeth Pearn for proof-reading the manuscript and helping to prepare it for publication, and Ms. 
Emily Ferguson, University of Dayton School of Law, Class of 2015, my research assistant, for her 
excellent work in researching citations and commenting on the manuscript. Finally, I offer my great-
est thanks to my wife and the love of my life, Debbie Russo, a fellow educator, for assisting with 
proofreading and commenting on drafts of this article in addition to the many ways in which she 
helps me in our life together. 
 1  This article uses the words “Equal Access Act” and the acronym “EAA” interchangeably. 
 2  20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1984). For an early commentary explaining key provisions of the act, 
see David S. Tatel & James G. Middlebrooks, An Introduction to the Equal Access Act, 21 EDUC. L. 
REP. 7 (1985). 
 3  454 U.S. 263 (1981).  
 4  See Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 396 (1993) 
(applying viewpoint neutrality, forbidding a public school board from denying a religious group’s 
access to district facilities as long as they were available to other organizations); for a later commen-
tary on this case, see Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles J. Russo, Lamb’s Chapel  Revisited, SCH. BUS. 
AFF., VOL. 64, NO. 11, 44–45 (1998); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 
(2001) (reasoning that a board violated a religious club’s rights to free speech by engaging in im-
permissible viewpoint discrimination in refusing to allow it to use school facilities to meet because 
of the religious content of its gatherings even though other groups could use facilities to address the 
same issues at their meetings albeit from secular perspectives); for a commentary on this case, see 
Charles J. Russo & Ralph D. Mawdsley, R.D. An End to the Heckler’s Veto: Good News Club v. 
Milford Central School. 28 RELIGION & EDUC. 79 (2001). 
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other organizations to meet on their campus.5 
Subsequently, Congress, via the EAA, expanded the reach of 
Widmar’s rationale by mandating that officials in public secondary 
schools6 receiving federal financial assistance must also allow non-
curriculum related student groups7 to meet during non-instructional time. 
Twenty-five years ago, in Mergens v. Westside Community Schools,8 the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the EAA. The Court found 
that Congress intended that insofar as most high school students could 
recognize that allowing religious clubs to function in public schools did 
not imply the endorsement of religion, the law should remain in place.9 
However, because only a plurality of Justices agreed that the EAA 
passed the Establishment Clause analysis, the Court left the door open to 
more litigation, leading to a line of cases considering the extent to which 
religious expression may be treated as a protected subset of free speech 
in school settings.10 
A quarter of a century after Mergens, the EAA’s status may be in 
doubt because the Supreme Court made a directional change regarding 
the rights of religious groups in public educational institutions. In Chris-
tian Legal Society v. Martinez,11 the Court eroded the rights of members 
of religious clubs in higher education to select leaders who share their 
values. The Martinez Court ruled that administrators at a public law 
school in California had the authority to implement a policy requiring all 
student groups, including on-campus religious groups, to admit all com-
ers from the student body. Under this policy, recognized campus groups 
had to admit “all comers,” regardless of whether potential members 
and/or leaders agreed with the group’s beliefs, as a condition of becom-
ing a recognized student organization.12 On remand, the Ninth Circuit re-
 
 5  Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277. 
 6  A federal trial court in Florida refused to extend the Act to a middle school in Carver 
Middle Sch. Gay-Straight Alliance v. Sch. Bd. of Lake Cnty., Fla., 2 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1292 (M.D. 
Fla. 2014). For a commentary on the application of the EAA to students who are not yet in second-
ary school, see Todd Hagins, Mother Goose and Father God: Extending The Equal Access Act to 
Pre-High-School Students, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 93 (2002–2003). 
 7  While recognizing that a significant body of litigation has arisen regarding access by non-
student groups to school facilities, including two cases that reached the Supreme Court, this article 
limits its focus to student groups under the parameters of the EAA. 
 8  496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
 9  Id. at 251. 
 10  See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). See 
also Travis v. Owego-Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming that once a board 
opened its facilities, it could not deny access to a not-for-profit pro-life pregnancy counseling organ-
ization). 
 11  Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Mar-
tinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010). 
 12  Id. at 697. 
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jected the group’s remaining claim on the ground that its leaders failed to 
preserve their argument that law school officials selectively applied the 
policy for appeal.13 
Even though the resolution of Martinez involved neither a K–12 set-
ting nor the EAA, Martinez does not bode well for religious freedom in 
schools. Martinez provides one more tool for critics of religious speech, 
whether in K–12 or higher education, as they seek to deny faith-based 
groups the opportunity to select leaders who comport with organizational 
goals. Opponents of free speech, especially religious speech, have moved 
from a “live and let live” attitude, allowing religious clubs to act as they 
wish, to a policy of “my way or the highway,” attempting to silence 
groups that refuse to comply with their dictates whether on membership 
requirements or even their very institutional missions.14 
As discussed later in this article, in a growing number of disturbing 
incidents, campus officials have stood Widmar and the EAA on their ears 
by requiring Christian student groups in particular to face draconian 
choices. Campus officials, marching under the flags of diversity and 
equality, while eschewing their espoused ideal of diversity, require stu-
dents, to compromise their values by accepting all comers as potential 
leaders, not just members, or else lose access to campus facilities and 
school funding.15 
In light of EAA-related litigation over the twenty-five years since the 
Supreme Court upheld the Act, the remainder of this article is divided 
into four substantive sections. The first section reviews the history of the 
EAA, beginning with Widmar. The second section focuses on Mergens 
and later litigation involving the EAA in disputes over religious and non-
religious clubs in K–12 schools. The third section examines related is-
sues in higher education, as highlighted by Martinez. The fourth section 
reflects on the precarious status of religious speech in K–12 and higher 
education, in light of Mergens and Martinez. Martinez threatens freedom 
of religion in the educational setting insofar as Martinez apparently de-
nies religious groups the right of self-determination by denying them the 
opportunity to select leaders who share organizational goals. 
 
 13  Christian Legal Soc’y v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483, 485 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 14  An egregious incident admittedly beyond involving governmental over-reach in attempt-
ing to limit religious speech occurred in Houston, Texas, where the mayor sought to subpoena the 
sermons of Christian pastors allegedly for bias based on sexual orientation. See, e.g., Texas: Subpoe-
nas of Speeches Given by Houston Pastors Is Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2014 at 14, available at 
2014 WLNR 30253741; Lisa Suhay, Why the City of Houston Wanted the Sermons of Five Christian 
Pastors, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 15, 2014, pagination unavailable online, 2014 
WLNR 28782074.   
 15  See Timothy J. Tracey, The Demise of Equal Access and a Return to the Early-American 
Understanding of Student Rights, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 557 (2013). 
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II. THE EQUAL ACCESS ACT: A PRE-HISTORY 
A. Widmar v. Vincent 
In Widmar v. Vincent,16 the Supreme Court ushered in a new era of 
access to public educational facilities. Widmar resulted when members of 
an on-campus religious group at the University of Missouri in Kansas 
City challenged a rule forbidding their group from meeting in campus 
facilities even though over 100 other registered student groups were free 
to do so.17 
The students unsuccessfully filed suit in a federal trial court in Mis-
souri claiming that officials violated their rights to the free exercise of 
religion, freedom of speech, and equal protection.18 The court upheld the 
rule on the grounds that officials never knowingly allowed any religious 
group to gather on campus and also that the Establishment Clause re-
quired such an outcome.19 The Eighth Circuit reversed in favor of the 
students in treating the university’s regulation as content-based discrimi-
nation against religious speech that was not justified by any compelling 
interest.20 The court further pointed out that the Establishment Clause did 
not forbid a policy of equal access to university property by all student 
groups insofar as officials made the facilities generally available.21 Dis-
satisfied with the outcome, university officials sought further review at 
the Supreme Court. 
Relying on the framework of freedom of speech, in an eight-to-one 
judgment authored by Justice Powell, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
Eighth Circuit’s reversal in favor of the students.22 The Court pointed out 
that insofar as university officials created a forum that made facilities 
generally available for the exchange of ideas, they could not deny a reli-
gious group equal access to them solely due to the content of the speech 
of its members.23 Finding that university officials created a limited public 
forum for student speech, the Court determined that they failed to 
demonstrate that the policy was narrowly drawn to achieve the compel-
ling state interest of not violating the Establishment Clause.24 At the 
same time, the Court distinguished Widmar from disputes involving reli-
 
 16  454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 17  Id. at 265. 
 18  Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979). 
 19  Id. at 910. 
 20  Chess v. Widmar 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 450 U.S. 909 (1981). 
 21  Id. at 1320. 
 22  Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981). 
 23  Id. at 267. 
 24  Id. at 275. 
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gious activities in public grade schools, explaining that facilities in those 
settings are generally not used as open fora and university students are 
less impressionable than young children.25 
At the heart of its analysis, the Supreme Court applied the seemingly 
ubiquitous tripartite test from Lemon v. Kurtzman.26 According to this 
test, 
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumu-
lative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests 
may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not 
foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion.”27 
In Widmar the Justices noted that both lower courts agreed that the forum 
policy issue that was created passed the first and third parts of the Lemon 
test because it had a secular purpose and avoided excessive government 
entanglement with religion.28 As to the “primary effects” part of the 
Lemon test, the Court agreed that absent evidence demonstrating that re-
ligious groups would have dominated the university’s open forum, 
providing equal access to the religious group did not have the primary 
effect of advancing religion.29 
Presaging the endorsement test that the Court would enunciate in 
Lynch v. Donnelly,30 the Court indicated that given the facts, officials 
could not have been perceived as endorsing religious speech because 
they would only have been providing the same benefit to the religious 
club that was available to other groups.31 Rounding out its rationale, the 
 
 25  Id. at 274 n.14. 
 26  403 U.S. 602 (1971) (invalidating statutes from Pennsylvania and Rhode Island permit-
ting various forms of aid to faith-based schools). When the Supreme Court applies the Lemon test in 
disputes over aid and religious activity, its failure to explain how, or why, it has become a kind of 
“one-size fits all” measure leaves lower courts, lawyers, commentators, and educators seeking clari-
ty. Confusion emerges because the Court failed to offer clear explanations of how the prongs in the 
test fit together. The first two prongs originated in companion cases that invalidated prayer and Bible 
reading in public schools, Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Meanwhile, 
the third prong emerged in a dispute that upheld New York State’s practice of providing state prop-
erty tax exemptions for church property used in worship services, Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York 
City, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
 27  Lemon, 403 U.S at 612–13.  
 28  Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271–72. 
 29  Id. at 274. 
 30  465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 31  Id. at 687–89 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (upholding the display of a crèche on public 
property). In addition to Lemon, the Court has applied two other tests. The “endorsement test” exam-
ines whether the purpose of a governmental action is to endorse or approve of a religion or religious 
activity. Justice O’Connor wrote that “[e]ndorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents 
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite 
message.” Id. at 687–88. She added that, “irrespective of government’s actual purpose, [if] the prac-
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Supreme Court reiterated that once officials created a limited open fo-
rum, they could not exclude religious groups from using meeting space.32 
Justice Stevens concurred to highlight his concern that the Supreme 
Court may have threatened academic freedom by requiring officials to 
open campus facilities as they did.33 
Justice White’s dissent rejected the application of the Free Speech 
claims.34 He argued that any burdens that campus officials placed on the 
religious group were minimal insofar as its meetings only would have 
had to move a short distance off campus.35 
B. Post-Widmar 
In the first post-Widmar case, the Supreme Court chose not to review 
a dispute from New York upholding a board’s refusal to allow students 
to conduct voluntary communal prayer meetings in school immediately 
before the start of the academic day.36 The Second Circuit had affirmed 
that the board did not infringe on students’ rights to the free exercise of 
religion, speech, or equal protection because officials had a compelling 
interest to remove any indication of their sponsoring religious activities 
in public schools.37 
The Supreme Court next declined to review a case from Texas 
wherein the Fifth Circuit invalidated a board policy of permitting stu-
dents to gather at a school with supervision for voluntary religious meet-
 
tice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. . . . [a court] should ren-
der the challenged practice invalid.” Id. at 690. For a commentary on this case, see Ralph D. 
Mawdsley, Lynch v. Donnelly: A New Constitutional Standard in Establishment Cases?, 18 EDUC. 
L. REP. 805 (1984). The Court articulated the “psychological coercion test” in Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (disallowing prayer at a public school graduation); for a brief commentary on 
this case, see Charles J. Russo, Lee v. Weisman: The Court Divines the Unconstitutionality of School 
Prayer, 19 RELIGION & PUB. EDUC. 120–23 (1992); see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 
U.S. 290, 306–10 (2000) (primarily relying on endorsement to invalidate a board policy of allowing 
student-led prayer prior to high school football games); for an analysis of this case, see Ralph D. 
Mawdsley & Charles J. Russo, Student Prayers at Public School Sporting Events: Doe v. Santa Fe 
Independent School District, 143 EDUC. LAW REP. 415 (2000). 
 32  Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277. 
 33   Id. at 277 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 34   Id. at 282 (White, J., dissenting). 
 35  Id. at 273–74. 
 36  Brandon v. Board of Educ. of Guilderland Cent. Sch. Dist., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981). 
 37  In a non-school case, Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 
652–53 (1981), the Court refused to grant a religious organization “rights to communicate . . . supe-
rior to those of other organizations having social, political, or other ideological messages to proselyt-
ize” in rejecting a challenge to a regulation of a state fair in Minnesota which required all solicita-
tions, sales, and/or distributions of material to be from fixed locations. For a later case reaching the 
same outcome at an airport, see International Soc’’y for Krishna Consciousness v. City of Los Ange-
les, 764 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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ings close to the beginning or end of the day.38 The tone of the court’s 
analysis suggested that the policy implied recognition of religious activi-
ties and meetings as an integral part of the school’s extracurricular pro-
gram with the implicit approval of educators.39 
III. THE EQUAL ACCESS ACT AND MERGENS 
A. The Equal Access Act 
Spurred on in large part by Widmar, in 1984 Congress enacted the 
Equal Access Act,40 primarily to protect religious freedom in schools. 
Even so, as highlighted later in this paper, supporters of students who 
seek to establish gay-straight and related LGBT clubs have succeeded in 
extending the reach of the Act to cover their cause. This outcome fits 
squarely within the EAA’s provisions.41 
Pursuant to the EAA 
[i]t shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which . . . has a 
limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or dis-
criminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting . . . on 
the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of 
the speech at such meetings.42 
The law proceeds to define “fair opportunity”: 
(c) Fair opportunity criteria 
Schools shall be deemed to offer a fair opportunity to students who 
wish to conduct a meeting within its limited open forum if such school 
uniformly provides that— 
(1) the meeting is voluntary and student-initiated; 
(2) there is no sponsorship of the meeting by the school, the gov-
ernment, or its agents or employees; 
(3) employees or agents of the school or government are present at 
religious meetings only in a non-participatory capacity; 
(4) the meeting does not materially and substantially interfere with 
 
 38  Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983). 
 39  Id. at 1044. 
 40  20 U.S.C. §§ 4071 et seq. (West 1984). 
 41   See Regina Grattan, Note, It’s Not Just for Religion Anymore: Expanding the Protections 
of the Equal Access Act to Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual High School Students, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
577 (1999).  
 42  20 U.S.C. § 4071(a). The act further specifies that “[a] public secondary school has a lim-
ited open forum whenever such school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more 
noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time.” 20 
U.S.C. § 4071(b)(2014). 
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the orderly conduct of educational activities within the school; and 
(5) non-school persons may not direct, conduct, control, or regular-
ly attend activities of student groups.43 
Perhaps the most significant limitation of the Act,44 noted in subsection 
(4), is that educational officials can exclude student-sponsored groups if 
their meetings materially and substantially interfere with the orderly 
conduct of school activities.45 
In a case from Pennsylvania, initiated prior to the passage of the 
Equal Access Act, the Supreme Court avoided reaching a decision on the 
merits.46 Students successfully filed suit when their school board denied 
the request of a Christian prayer group to meet, the only club so denied 
access to facilities.47 In a five-to-four order, the Court held that a former 
school board member lacked standing to appeal the trial court’s order 
recognizing the Christian club’s right to conduct prayer meetings on pub-
lic school grounds during regular class hours.48 The trial court’s reason-
ing was that the board policy created a student activity period open to 
any student club that contributed to the intellectual, physical, or social 
development of students.49 
B. Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens 
High school students sued their school board for refusing to permit 
them to organize a Christian Bible study club pursuant to the Equal Ac-
cess Act.50 The federal trial court in Nebraska upheld the board’s denial 
of access but the Eighth Circuit reversed in favor of the students on the 
ground that the presence of non-curriculum related clubs at the school 
created a limited open forum under the Act.51 On appeal to the Supreme 
Court, the board raised two challenges: whether the school was a limited 
open forum within the meaning of the Act and whether the law violated 
 
 43  20 U.S.C. § 4071(c). 
 44  For a representative commentary on the EAA, see Aaron H. Caplan, Stretching The 
Equal Access Act Beyond Equal Access, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 273 (2003).   
 45  This language is based on Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
509 (1969) (upholding student free speech rights by wearing black armbands) (internal citations 
omitted) “. . .where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 
‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the opera-
tion of the school,’ the prohibition cannot be sustained.” 
 46  Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697, 698 (M.D. Pa. 1983), rev’d, 
741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1986), vacated, 475 U.S. 534 (1986). 
 47  Id. 
 48  Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 548–49 (1986). 
 49  Bender, 563 F. Supp. 697, 709 (M.D. Pa. 1983). 
 50  Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 226–27 (1990).  
 51   Mergens v. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. (Dist. 66), 
 867 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1989). 
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the Establishment Clause if officials created such a forum.52 
Writing for the Court, in Board of Education of Westside Community 
Schools v. Mergens,53 Justice O’Connor examined the history of the 
Act.54 The Court relied on statutory interpretation, and eight members 
voted to uphold the Act in four different opinions.55 
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court recognized that both sides 
agreed that the school was a public secondary institution receiving feder-
al assistance within the meaning of the Act. Turning to another crucial 
matter, acknowledging that the Act failed to define “non-curriculum re-
lated,” the Court thought it necessary to review the status of some stu-
dent groups.56 
Insofar as the majority agreed that the Act’s legislative purpose was 
to extend the Widmar Court’s reasoning of ending discrimination against 
religious speech to secondary schools, it found a “non-curriculum related 
student group” is “best interpreted broadly to mean any student group 
that does not directly relate to the body of courses offered by the 
school.”57 Such an approach, the Court reasoned, was in accord with 
congressional intent to provide a low threshold for triggering the Act. 
In reaching its interpretation, the Supreme Court rejected the board’s 
open-ended assertion that curriculum related clubs basically meant any-
thing educators were willing to accept regardless of how tenuous a 
 
 52  Mergens, 496 U.S. at 273. 
 53 Id. Parts of the analysis of Mergens rely on David L. Gregory & Charles J. Russo, Let Us 
Pray (But Not ‘Them!’): The Troubled Jurisprudence of Religious Liberty. 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
273 (1991). 
 54  For representative commentary on Mergens, see, e.g., Lawrence F. Rossow, Limits on 
Discretion in Applying the Equal Access Act: Mergens v. Board of Education of Westside Commu-
nity Schools, 56 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1990); Marie Wilna Fleming & Ronald L. Peeler, Mergens: The 
Beginning, Not the End, of Questions Arising Under the Equal Access Act, 64 EDUC. L. REP. 1 
(1991); Dena S. Davis, Religious Clubs in the Public Schools: What Happened After Mergens? 64 
ALB. L. REV. 225 (2000). 
 55  Justice O’Connor authored the plurality opinion and was joined in Part I (facts) and Part 
II (statutory construction) by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, Scalia, and 
Kennedy joining Part III (establishment clause analysis). Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, 
concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 258. Justice Marshall, joined 
by Justice Brennan, concurred in the judgment. Id. at 263. Justice Stevens dissented. Id. at 270. 
 56  In an Appendix the Court attached the Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 63 which identified a wide 
array of organizations, some of which had a tenuous relationship to the school curriculum at best: 
band; chess club; cheerleaders; choir; class officers; distributive education; speech & debate; drill 
squad & squires; future business leaders of America; future medical assistants; interact; international 
club; Latin club (junior classical league); math club; student publications; student forum; dramatics; 
creative writing club; 20 photography club; orchestra; outdoor education; swimming timing team; 
student advisory board; intramurals; competitive athletics; Zonta club; subsurfers; Westside club; 
wrestling auxiliary; and National Honor Society. Id. at 253.  
 57  Mergens, 496 U.S. at 239 (emphasis in original). Even Justice Marshall, concurred on 
this point. “I agree with the majority that ‘noncurriculum’ must be construed broadly to ‘prohibit 
schools from discriminating on the basis of the content of a student group’s speech.” Id. at 262 
(Marshall, J., concurring). 
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group’s relationship was to academic matters.58 The Court rebuffed the 
board’s position as a ruse designed to hollow out the protection afforded 
religious groups, the very reason why the law was enacted.59 Instead, the 
Court observed that insofar as a variety of the named clubs failed to 
demonstrate a close connection to the school curriculum, the prayer and 
Bible study club was entitled to meet in school.60 The Court explained 
that if school officials created a limited open forum permitting non-
curriculum related groups to meet during non-instructional time, then 
they were obligated to grant equal access to the student-sponsored Bible 
study club.61 
The Justices ultimately disagreed, though, over whether the Equal 
Access Act violated the Establishment Clause.62 Writing for the plurality, 
Justice O’Connor noted that in Widmar the Court upheld the principle of 
equal access under the Lemon v. Kurtzman63 test. Maintaining that the 
Court’s rationale from Widmar was applicable, Justice O’Connor re-
viewed each of Lemon’s three prongs.64 
First, Justice O’Connor found that the stated legislative purpose of 
the Act, to prevent discrimination against religious and other types of 
speech, was undeniably secular.65 Moreover, she asserted that even if 
some members of Congress intended solely to protect religious speech, 
the Act had to be upheld because the Court’s duty was to examine the 
Act’s legislative purpose, not the subjective motives of the legislators.66 
Second, Justice O’Connor rejected the school board’s argument that 
the Act had the primary effect of advancing religion. Justice O’Connor 
engaged in three related analyses. First, she rebuffed the claim that a 
prayer club created a symbolic union between government and religion 
in the minds of students. She reasoned that high school students, compa-
rable to their counterparts in higher education, are able to distinguish be-
tween a board’s permitting a club that prays on campus from an official 
endorsement of prayer.67 While conceding the risk of peer pressure,68 Jus-
 
 58  Id. at 265–66. 
 59  Id. at 266. 
 60  Id. at 287. 
 61  Id. at 288–89. 
 62  Id. at 275–76  
 63  403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 64  Mergens, 496 U.S. at 272–75.  
 65  Id. at 248–49. 
 66  Id. at 249. 
 67  This thinking is consistent with the view of Congress, which relied on testimony that stu-
dents are mature enough to perceive religious neutrality. See S. Rep. No. 357, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 
(1984). Congress also referred to, and was apparently influenced by, a Note in the Yale Law Journal, 
which argued that high school students possess sufficient maturity to perceive religious neutrality. 
Id. However, at least one empirical study casts doubt on the ability of high school students to per-
ceive religious neutrality. See Lawrence F. Rossow & Nancy Rossow, High School Prayer Clubs: 
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tice O’Connor emphasized that because the meetings were permitted on-
ly during non-instructional time, participation by school officials at pray-
er club meetings could not create the impression of official endorse-
ment.69 Second, she maintained that if school officials make it clear that 
prayer clubs are on campus solely because students asked to create them, 
then others would not reasonably be able to infer endorsement of the 
clubs or religion.70 Finally, she explained that insofar as the prayer club 
was only one of a wide variety of student-initiated voluntary organiza-
tions, pupils would have been unlikely to perceive it as an official en-
dorsement. Thus, Justice O’Connor concluded that the Act, both on its 
face and as applied in Mergens, did not have the primary effect of ad-
vancing religion.71 
As to the third and final prong of the Lemon test, Justice O’Connor 
rejected the argument that the club’s presence in school resulted in ex-
cessive entanglement.72 She noted that while the Act allows educational 
officials to assign supervisory personnel to ensure proper student behav-
ior, it forbids monitoring, participation, or involvement by faculty or 
non-school personnel, as well as official school sponsorship of such 
clubs.73 She warned that official efforts to deny prayer clubs opportuni-
ties to form and meet ran a greater risk of entanglement in light of the 
machinations in which officials would have to engage in deciding wheth-
er clubs could form and meet on school premises.74 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, agreed that the Act did not 
violate the Establishment Clause but would have eschewed the Lemon 
test.75 Rather, he considered whether the Act gave such a direct benefit to 
clubs that it bordered on establishment or so coerced participation in ac-
tivities infringing on the right to free exercise.76 
In a lengthier concurrence, Justice Marshall agreed that the Act could 
withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny.77 However, because he be-
 
Can Students Perceive Religious Neutrality? 45 EDUC. L. REP. 475 (1988) (psychological data sup-
ports notion that high school students cannot perceive neutrality). Other studies indicate both that 
peers exercise a great deal of influence in high school and that levels of maturity among adolescents 
may vary greatly. 
 68  Justice Kennedy later picked up on the notion of peer pressure, addressing it as coercion 
in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992). 
 69  Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249–52.  
 70  Id. at 278. 
 71  Id. at 249–52. 
 72  Id. at 252–53. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. at 258 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 76  Id. at 258, 260–62 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 77  Id. at 263 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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lieved that school officials needed to take special care to avoid creating 
even the appearance of endorsing the goals of prayer clubs, he offered 
suggestions on how educators could sidestep such situations. 
Arguing that Congress intended to create a narrower forum for stu-
dent clubs, Justice Stephens’ dissent would have rejected the EAA as un-
constitutional without even reaching the Establishment Clause question.78 
He would have invalidated the law, contending that the high school set-
ting in Mergens differed significantly from the higher education context 
in Widmar, and that the Act resulted in a “sweeping intrusion by the Fed-
eral Government into the operation of our public schools.”79 
Because only four Justices agreed that the Equal Access Act passed 
Establishment Clause analysis, the Supreme Court left the door open to 
more litigation in a line of cases that treat religious expression as a hy-
brid that protects the rights of religious groups to express their opinions 
as a form of free speech.80 
1. Post-Mergens 
a. K–12 religious clubs.  
A case with a lengthy procedural history arose in Washington before 
Mergens reached the Supreme Court but was ultimately resolved in favor 
of students four years after the Justices upheld the EAA. After a federal 
trial court81 and the Ninth Circuit82 rejected student attempts to create a 
Christian prayer club, the Supreme Court summarily vacated in their fa-
vor.83 Following another trial court order in favor of board officials who 
refused to allow students to form the club,84 the Ninth Circuit ultimately 
reversed in the students’ favor.85 The court held that insofar as the EAA 
preempts state law, officials could not forbid a prayer club from meeting 
in one of the district’s high schools.86 The court further explained that a 
 
 78  Id. at 270 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 79  Id. at 291. 
 80   See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); see 
also Travis v. Owego–Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming that once a 
board opened its facilities, it could not deny access to a pro-life pregnancy counseling organization). 
 81  Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 675 F. Supp. 1268 (W.D. Wash. 1987).  
 82  Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 865 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1989), opinion amended 
and superseded by 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989). For a commentary on this case at this early stage, 
see, Lawrence F. Rossow, Equal Access Act: Garnett v. Renton School District No. 403, 54 EDUC. L. 
REP. 391 (1989).   
 83  Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 496 U.S. 914 (1990). 
 84  Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 772 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Wash. 1991). 
 85  Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 
U.S. 819 (1993), 21 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 1994), on remand, 1994 WL 555397 (W.D. Wash. 1994) 
(granting declaratory judgment and awarding attorney fees to the plaintiffs). 
 86  For commentaries on the tension between federal and state law in this area, see, e.g., Eu-
gene C. Bjorklun, The Equal Access Act and State Constitutions: The Final Chapter? 86 EDUC. L. 
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provision in the EAA stipulating that it not be construed as requiring 
school officials to sanction otherwise unlawful meetings did not allow 
them to exclude religious groups on the basis that use of school facilities 
by such clubs violated the state constitution.  
Circuit courts have extended the scope of the Equal Access Act. For 
example, the Second Circuit allowed students to select leaders who com-
plied with their club’s religious standards.87  A majority of the court 
agreed that Club bylaws could require the President, Vice President, and 
Music Coordinator to accept Jesus Christ as Savior because these officers 
were expected to lead Christian prayers and devotions while safeguard-
ing the “spiritual content” of the meetings.88 However, a divided court, 
with one dissent, affirmed that the requirement could not be applied to 
the Club’s Secretary and Activities Coordinator since their duties had lit-
tle, if anything, to do with religion. Other circuits permitted clubs to meet 
during lunchtime89 and during a morning activity period at which attend-
ance was taken;90 to enjoy access to funding and fund-raising activities, a 
yearbook, public address system, bulletin board, school supplies, school 
vehicles, and audio-visual equipment;91 and to broadcast a video promot-
ing a club during morning announcements.92 
In a case from California, the Ninth Circuit initially upheld a school 
board’s refusal to recognize a religious club in light of its proposed re-
quirement that voting members express their faith in the Bible and in Je-
sus Christ because officials feared that it violated the district’s non-
discrimination policies.93 On further review, though, an en banc panel re-
versed in favor of the organizers.94 The Ninth Circuit found that although 
the board did not violate either the Equal Access Act or the club’s First 
Amendment rights by applying its non-discrimination policy to the dis-
puted provision, a question of fact was present as to whether educators 
acted appropriately in refusing to grant the club an exemption from the 
policy based on its Christian character or the content of the speech of its 
 
REP. 1 (1993); Larry D. Bartlett, The Equal Access Act v. State Constitutions: The Supremacy 
Clause Question, 71 EDUC. L. REP. 983 (1992). 
 87  Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist., 85 F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 
1040 (1996). For a commentary on this case, see Charles J. Russo & Ralph D. Mawdsley, Hsu v. 
Roslyn Union Free School District No. 3: An Update on the Rights of High School Students Under 
the Equal Access Act, 114 EDUC. L. REP. 359 (1996).  
 88  Hsu, 85 F.3d at 858. 
 89  Ceniceros v. Bd. of Tr. of the San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 90   Donovan ex rel. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 91  Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 813 (2003). 
 92  Krestan v. Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 97, of Maricopa Cnty., 561 F. Supp. 2d 
1078 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
 93  Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 499 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 94  Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 524 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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members.95 
On the other hand, at least one court rejected the claim that a school 
board in Mississippi created a limited open forum designed to permit 
members of a religious club to make announcements involving prayers 
and Bible readings before classes on a school’s public address system.96 
The court did permit voluntary student prayer before school to continue. 
In an emerging case from Colorado, students sued their school board 
alleging that officials allowed them to gather informally for activities 
during specified home room periods, but forbade them from meeting to 
pray, sing religious songs, or engage in discussion.97 
b.Gay-Straight and LGBT Clubs.  
 Students who sought to form clubs related to LGBT issues experi-
enced mixed success under the Equal Access Act.98 In the first of three 
related cases from Utah, high school students with a gay-positive per-
spective challenged a board policy denying them an opportunity to meet 
at school during non-instructional time and to have access to school fa-
cilities.99 The federal trial court interpreted the policy as violating the 
group’s EAA rights because it denied the students the chance to meet 
when another non-curriculum-related student group was permitted to do 
so.100 The same court later remarked that insofar as the plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate how the policy had a disparate impact on their viewpoint, it 
did not have to examine the actual motives of board members regarding 
their allegations.101 
In the third case, the court reviewed the standards governing access 
to the limited forum that the board created for curriculum-related student 
clubs at the high school when a club sought to examine the impact, expe-
rience, and contributions of gays and lesbians in history and current 
events.102 The court granted the club’s request for a preliminary injunc-
tion because there was substantial likelihood of success on the merits of 
its First Amendment claim that the school official who was responsible 
 
 95  Id. at 974. 
 96  Herdahl v. Pontotoc Cnty. Sch. Dist., 933 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Miss. 1996). 
 97  Windebank v. Academy Sch. Dist. #20, Case 1:14-cv-03025 (D. Colo., filed Nov. 7, 
2014); the complaint is available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/WindebankComplaint.pdf. 
 98  For representative commentary in the growing body of literature on the evolving issues 
associated with LGBT clubs and similar groups, see, e.g., Todd A. De Mitchell & Richard Fossey, 
Student Speech: School Boards, Gay/ Straight Alliances, and the Equal Access Act, 2008 BYU 
EDUC. & L.J. 89 (2008); Carolyn Pratt, Note, Protecting the Marketplace of Ideas in the Classroom: 
Why the Equal Access Act and the First Amendment Require the Recognition of Gay/ Straight Alli-
ances in America’s Public Schools, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 370 (2007).  
 99  East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Utah 1999). 
 100  Id. 
 101  Id. at 1199–1205. 
 102  East High Sch. Prism Club v. Seidel, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1240 (D. Utah 2000). 
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for evaluating its application misapplied the appropriate standards or 
added a new one.103 Further, the Eighth Circuit,104 along with federal trial 
courts in California,105 Florida,106 Indiana,107 and Kentucky,108 agreed that 
educational officials could not deny Gay/Straight Alliance clubs the op-
portunity to use school facilities under the EAA. 
On the other hand, a federal trial court in Texas upheld a board’s re-
jection of a gay-straight student association’s requests that members be 
permitted to post and distribute fliers about it at a high school, to use the 
school’s public address system for announcements, and to be recognized 
as a student group with the right to meet on campus.109 The court main-
tained that educators’ investigation of the association’s Web site, which 
led to the discovery of sexually explicit postings, was reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory pursuant to the First Amendment.110 Insofar as the 
Equal Access Act includes exceptions for avoiding disruption and pre-
serving order in schools to protect student well-being, the court thought 
educators acted lawfully in denying the association’s requests.111 In addi-
tion, a Gay/Straight Alliance Club in Colorado failed to procure a prelim-
inary injunction ordering officials to recognize the group.112 In an unre-
ported opinion, the federal trial court concluded that the school’s policy 
of officially recognizing only “curricular” clubs did not violate the Equal 
Access Act.113 
 
 103  Id. at 1251. 
 104  Straights and Gays for Equal. v. Osseo Area Sch.Dist. (No. 279), 540 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 
2008). 
 105  Colin ex rel. Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (C.D. Cal. 2004).  
 106  Gay–Straight Alliance of Yulee High Sch. v. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty., 602 F. Supp. 2d 
1233 (M.D. Fla. 2009); Gonzalez v. Sch. Bd. of Okeechobee Cnty., 571 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (S.D. Fla. 
2008). For the history of this case, see Gay–Straight Alliance of Okeechobee High Sch. v. Sch. Bd. 
of Okeechobee Cnty., 483 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 
 107  Franklin Cent. Gay/Straight Alliance v. Franklin Twp. Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. IP01-1518 
C-M/S, 2002 WL 32097530 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 30), reconsideration denied, 2002 WL 31921332 (S.D. 
Ind. Dec. 26, 2002). 
 108   Boyd Cnty. High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd Cnty., Ky., 258 F. 
Supp.2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2003). This case spawned litigation in which the student sought to be exclud-
ed from diversity training that focused on diversity and equity issues including discussion of anti-gay 
harassment. See Morrison v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd Cnty., 521 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
555 U.S. 1171 (2009) (affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the board because the stu-
dent failed to demonstrate how a favorable judgment might have redressed what it described as his 
purported injury and that he lacked standing to claim that the policy chilled his right to free speech). 
 109  Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp.2d 550, 571–72 (N.D. Tex. 2004). 
For a commentary on this case, see Sarah Orman, Note, “Being Gay in Lubbock”: The Equal Ac-
cess Act in Caudillo, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 227 (2006). 
 110  Caudillo ex rel. Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 561 (N.D. 
Tex. 2004). 
 111  Id. at 570. 
 112  Palmer High Sch. Gay/Straight Alliance v. Colo. Springs Sch. Dist. No. 11, 2005 WL 
3244049, *5 (D. Colo. 2005). 
 113  For a conceptually related case, see Hatcher ex rel. Hatcher v. DeSoto Cnty. Sch. Dist. 
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IV. CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V. MARTINEZ 
A. History 
Even in conceding that the underlying dispute was set in higher edu-
cation, the status of the Equal Access Act may be in some doubt in light 
of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez 
(“Martinez”).114 At issue in Martinez was a disagreement that occurred 
on the campus of Hastings College of the Law, an institution in the Uni-
versity of California system, over its policy governing official recogni-
tion to on-campus student groups.  Recognized student organizations 
(“RSOs”) at Hastings are granted access to the use of the institutional 
name and logo along with access to funds, facilities, and channels of 
communication.  In return, RSOs must comply with the college’s nondis-
crimination policy, which, consistent with California state law, forbids 
discrimination on an array of criteria including religion and sexual orien-
tation.  Hastings officials interpreted this policy as requiring RSOs to ac-
cept “all comers,” meaning that they must allow all students to join and 
seek leadership positions regardless of their status or beliefs, even when 
these might be inconsistent with organizational goals. 
The dispute giving rise to the litigation in Martinez arose at the start 
of the 2004–05 academic year when the Hastings campus branch of the 
Christian Legal Society elected to affiliate with the national group. In af-
filiating with the national organization, the campus group adopted its by-
laws including the requirement that members and officers sign a “State-
ment of Faith” directing members to comply with its principles such as 
the belief that sexual activity should not occur outside of marriage be-
tween a man and a woman, whether heterosexual or homosexual.  The 
national Society interprets its bylaws as excluding individuals from affil-
iation with it for engaging in “unrepentant homosexual conduct” or for 
having religious convictions different from those specified in its State-
ment of Faith. 
Hastings officials rejected the Society’s application to acquire status 
 
Bd. of Educ., 939 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (M.D. Fla. 2013), aff’d ex rel. Hatcher v. Fusco, 570 F. App’x 
874 (11th Cir. 2014) (rejecting a principal’s motion for summary judgment where a student filed suit 
after she was denied permission to organize a rally and participate in the “National Day of Silence” 
at her high school to call attention to harms associated with bullying and harassment of those who 
are lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender where issues of fact remained over whether he violated 
her rights, but rejecting the student’s speech claims against the board and the principal alleging that 
he violated her right to equal protection absent evidence she was treated differently than others who 
were similarly situated). 
 114  Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Mar-
tinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010). For a much more detailed analysis commentary on this case, see Charles 
J. Russo & William E. Thro, Another Nail in the Coffin of Religious Freedom? Christian Legal So-
ciety v. Martinez, 12 EDUC. L. J. 20 (2011).  
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as an RSO because its organizational bylaws differed from the school’s 
“all-comers” policy by excluding students based on religion and sexual 
orientation.  Officials thus prohibited the Society from meeting on cam-
pus and using school resources.  The Society sought to enjoin enforce-
ment of Hastings’ policy, alleging that compliance would have violated 
its rights to speech, association, and religion. 
In refusing to enjoin the policy, a federal trial court in California, de-
creed that the “all-comers” condition was a reasonable, viewpoint neutral 
policy that neither impermissibly impaired the Society’s right to expres-
sive association nor was it unacceptable because it did not require the 
group to admit members or limit speech.115 The court posited that, if any-
thing, the policy merely placed conditions on the use of school facilities 
and funds.116 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the “all-comers” policy 
was reasonable and viewpoint neutral.117 Because the Ninth Circuit’s 
judgment in Martinez directly conflicted with a case from Indiana in 
which the Seventh Circuit, in Christian Legal Society v. Walker,118 up-
held the rights of another campus branch of the Society to apply its 
membership rules, the Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal to resolve 
this split. 
B. Supreme Court Analyses 
1. Majority 
In a five-to-four judgment, the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the “all-comers” policy.119  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Ginsburg was joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Breyer, and 
Sotomayor. The majority initially seemed reluctant to deny access to 
campus facilities to student groups based on their viewpoints.120  The 
Court acknowledged that it faced a novel question and framed the issue 
as whether “a public law school [may] condition its official recognition 
of a student group—and the attendant use of school funds and facili-
ties—on the organization’s agreement to open eligibility for membership 
 
 115  Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW, 2006 WL 
997217, at *13–14 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2006), aff’d sub nom. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. 
of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010).  
 116  Id. at 51. 
 117  Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, 319 Fed. Appx, 645, 646 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 118  Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006). For a commentary on this 
case, see Charles J. Russo & William E. Thro, The Constitutional Rights of Politically Incorrect 
Groups: Christian Legal Society v. Walker as an Illustration, 33 J.C. & U.L. 361 (2007). 
 119  Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010). 
 120  Id. at 667. 
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and leadership to all students?”121 
Treating access to facilities as a subsidy, the Supreme Court began 
its analysis by combining the Society’s freedom of speech and associa-
tion claims in light of the Court’s limited public forum jurisprudence.122  
In this regard, the Court failed to provide sufficient detail for those who 
were less familiar with this area of the law. 
In reviewing First Amendment claims, the Justices have identified 
three different types of forums: traditional public forums, non-public fo-
rums, and limited open forums.123 The government’s regulatory power is 
most restricted in traditional public forums such as parks, streets, and 
sidewalks;124 but this analysis was inapplicable in Martinez. Further, the 
Court found that the non-public forum doctrine, the second forum, typi-
cally applicable in classrooms that are “not by tradition or designation a 
forum for public communication,” was equally inapplicable.125 
As to the third forum, akin to the limited open forum under the Equal 
Access Act, the Supreme Court held that the appropriate standard was 
that of a “limited public forum,” property that the state, qua Hastings, 
opened for public use as a place for expressive activity.126  The Court 
recognized that officials at public institutions can create such fora either 
by express policy or practice.127  Following its review of cases in which 
the majority applied this analysis, the Court interpreted the “all-comers” 
policy as reasonable for two reasons: first, the Justices were of the view 
that insofar as they ordinarily granted deference to educational leaders, 
school officials had the authority to establish such a policy.128 Second, 
the Court decided that the reasons Hastings officials advanced for adopt-
ing the policy, namely providing leadership opportunities for students, 
forbidding discrimination based on status, and bringing individuals of all 
types together, were constitutional as legitimate and non-
discriminatory.129 
The Supreme Court determined that the policy was reasonable be-
cause of the off-campus alternative channels that were available to the 
Society after it lost its status as an RSO.130  The Court next rejected the 
 
 121  Id. at 668. 
 122  Id. at 679. 
 123  See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 124  Id.; Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (discussing 
forum analysis). 
 125  Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. 
 126  Martinez, 561 U.S. 690–91.  
 127  Id. at 699. 
 128  Id. at 685–88.  
 129  Id. at 688–90.  
 130  Id. at 665. 
4_Russo Edited (Do Not Delete) 7/10/2015  6:09 PM 
2] LIVE AND LET LIVE TO MY WAY OR HIGHWAY 471 
Society’s concerns “as more hypothetical than real” 131 that if it had to 
comply with the policy there would be no diversity of perspectives on 
campus and that individuals who were hostile to it could infiltrate its 
ranks in order to subvert its mission. The majority held that insofar as the 
policy allowed clubs to condition eligibility for membership and leader-
ship positions on such qualifications as attendance at meetings, dues 
payment, and other neutral criteria, the Society’s concerns were un-
founded.132 
Having upheld the “all-comers” policy as constitutional, the Court 
remanded Martinez for further consideration. The Justices indicated that 
insofar as the lower courts failed to address whether Hastings officials 
selectively enforced the “all-comers” policy, the Ninth Circuit had to 
consider the extent to which the Society´s argument may have still been 
viable.133 
2. Concurrences 
Justices Stevens and Kennedy concurred separately.  Justice Stevens 
authored a brief opinion in which he sought to rebut Justice Alito’s dis-
sent.134 He responded that while the Society had the right to limit mem-
bership off campus, the First Amendment does not require Hastings’ pol-
icy to permit such limitations while granting the Society official 
recognition.135 
Justice Kennedy agreed that law school officials and the Society 
stipulated that there was no evidence of viewpoint discrimination in the 
policy.136 Still, he observed that the result may have been different had 
the Society been able to prove that the “all-comers” policy was designed 
or used to infiltrate its membership or challenge its leadership in an at-
tempt to stifle its perspective, an issue that may arise in future litiga-
tion.137 
3. Dissent 
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Jus-
tice Thomas, dissented.138  At the outset of his lengthy dissent, Justice 
Alito remarked that the Court imposed a significant restriction on reli-
 
 131  Id. at 692. 
 132  Id. at 863–64. 
 133  Id. at 697–98.  
 134  Id. at 698 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 135  Id. at 698–703 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 136  Id. at 703 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 137  Id. at 706 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 138  Id. at 706 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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gious freedom, especially since law school officials had not relied on the 
“all-comers” policy until the Christian group initiated its claims.139 Alito 
added that the policy unreasonably infringed on the rights of those active 
in the organization because it placed a substantial burden on their reli-
gious free exercise rights but no other group in a limited open forum that 
was supposed to be viewpoint neutral.140 
C. Remand 
On remand, the Ninth Circuit rejected Society’s remaining claims 
that Hastings officials violated their right to religious freedom.141  The 
court refused to permit the case to proceed, because its leaders failed to 
preserve their argument that university officials selectively applied the 
policy.142  The court thus contended that the Society was not entitled to 
“a second bite at the appellate apple.”143 
D. Reflections 
Post Martinez, and notwithstanding the Equal Access Act and 
Mergens, the status of religious speech and expression—not to mention 
association— in K–12 or higher public education institutions is at grave 
risk.144 As demonstrated by Martinez, it is increasingly difficult for faith-
based groups on campuses and other environments that are hostile to ide-
as that differ from perceived politically correct norms. This is particular-
ly true when dealing with matters involving human sexuality as organiza-
tions seek to preserve their membership rules and values grounded in 
their sincerely held religious beliefs while in the “marketplace of ide-
as.”145 
 
 139  Id. at 711–12 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 140  Id. at 720 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 141  Christian Legal Soc’y v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 142  Id. 
 143  Id. (quoting Kesselring v. F/T Arctic Hero, 95 F.3d 23, 24 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)). 
 144  Parts of this analysis plays off of Charles J. Russo, Religious Freedom in the United 
States: “When you Come to the Fork in the Road Take It,” 38 U. DAYTON L. REV. 363 (2013). 
 145  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831–32 (1995) (ap-
plying viewpoint neutrality in holding that a policy permitting university officials to authorize pay-
ment for printing the publications of student organizations applied to a Christian journal, because its 
speech was protected by the First Amendment: 
The dissent’s assertion that no viewpoint discrimination occurs because the Guidelines discrim-
inate against an entire class of viewpoints reflects an insupportable assumption that all debate is 
bipolar and that antireligious speech is the only response to religious speech. Our understanding 
of the complex and multifaceted nature of public discourse has not embraced such a contrived 
description of the marketplace of ideas. If the topic of debate is, for example, racism, then ex-
clusion of several views on that problem is just as offensive to the First Amendment as exclu-
sion of only one. It is as objectionable to exclude both a theistic and an atheistic perspective on 
the debate as it is to exclude one, the other, or yet another political, economic, or social view-
point. The dissent’s declaration that debate is not skewed so long as multiple voices are si-
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It is curious that leaders in public educational institutions who value 
diversity in terms of such privileged personal characteristics as race, 146 
gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, are increasingly intolerant of 
other types of ideological diversity. This intolerance is often led by 
“many on the political left . . . [who] have taken to calling themselves 
and their causes ‘progressive,’”147 purportedly operating under the banner 
of openness to all. Yet, many of these self-proclaimed “progressives” are 
adamantly closed to views that do not comport with prevailing politically 
correct flavors of the day. These individuals essentially undercut the very 
diversity of opinion they supposedly speak of by “casting a pall of ortho-
doxy”148 in schools and on campuses. 
Some critics of a Christian149 worldview150 often demonize or ridicule 
those with whom they differ.151 Such an approach is consistent with the 
 
lenced is simply wrong; the debate is skewed in multiple ways.   
Id.).  
 146  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (declaring that insofar as diversity is a 
compelling governmental interest, officials at the University of Michigan Law School could use race 
as a factor in admissions decisions pursuant to its race conscious admissions policy since the criteria 
were sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of having a racially di-
verse student body); for a commentary on this case, see William E. Thro & Charles J.  Russo, The 
Constitutionality of Racial Preferences in K–12 Education After Grutter and Gratz, 211 EDUC. L. 
REP. 537 (2006). However, in Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
race conscious plan as insufficiently narrowly tailored, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), but the Fifth Circuit 
upheld it on remand in Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014), meaning that the case 
may well be headed back to the High Court.  For a commentary on the Supreme Court’s judgment, 
see Charles J. Russo. Fisher v. University of Texas: The Beginning of the End or the End of the Be-
ginning of Race Conscious Admissions Plans in Higher Education in the United States? 14 EDUC. L. 
J. 284 (2013).  
 147   Michael Allan Wolf, Looking Backward: Richard Epstein Ponders The “Progressive” 
Peril, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1233, 1245, n.50 (2007).  
 148  Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
 149  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: HOW RELIGION POISONS 
EVERYTHING (2007) (while examining other faiths, singling out Judeo-Christian beliefs as the pri-
mary targets of his vindictiveness); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION (2005). 
 150  The entertainer Elton John displayed evidence of growing intolerance for religion in an 
interview: “I think religion has always tried to turn hatred towards gay people. From my point of 
view, I would ban religion completely . . . Organized religion doesn’t seem to work. It turns people 
into really hateful lemmings and it’s not really compassionate.” Elton John says religion leads to 
homophobia, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto) R2, available at 2006 WLNR 19665613. 
 151  The Catholic Church is by no means alone in being singled out for criticism for its be-
liefs. For instance, the Southern Poverty Law Center has apparently demonstrated broadly anti-
Christian attitudes without regard to particular denominations within Christianity in light of its dif-
ference of opinion with regard to a variety of issues. See Matt Barber, Bloody Hands: The Southern 
Poverty Law Center, TOWNHALL.COM (Feb. 11, 2013), 
http://townhall.com/columnists/mattbarber/2013/02/11/bloody-hands-the-southern-poverty-law-
center-n1509321/page/full/11, 2013,  (“‘The Southern Poverty Law Center has a long history of ma-
liciously slandering pro-family groups with language and labels that incite hatred and undermine 
civil discourse,’ said Mat Staver, founder and chairman of Liberty Counsel.”).  See also Katie Yoder, 
Networks Ignore FRC Shooter’s Use of SPLC ‘Hate Map,’ MEDIA RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 7, 
2013), http://www.mrc.org/articles/networks-ignore-frc-shooters-use-splc-hate-map (detailing how 
the mainstream media failed to report that the map a man used to locate the headquarters of the Fam-
ily Research Center in Washington, D.C., where he shot and injured a guard, was created at the 
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approach promoted by Saul Alinsky, intellectual patron of President 
Barack Obama,152 whose administration has not been friendly to religious 
freedom.153 Mr. Alinsky explicitly described his Rule 5 as “Ridicule is 
man’s most potent weapon,”154 promiscuously using such labels as racist 
and homophobe rather than engage in rational discourse. These critics 
apparently fail to recognize that those with whom they disagree are not 
necessarily evil, but ought to be accorded the same respect and civil 
treatment they expect for themselves.  In like manner, proponents of 
dominant perspectives ought not to be permitted to preclude others from 
being allowed to engage in peaceful expressions155 of their differing 
points of view.156  In this regard, the Supreme Court has, as noted, pro-
tected religious expression as a subset of First Amendment free 
speech,157 including speech that can be viewed as offensive.158 
 
SPLC; the map also identified the locations of the offices of groups with which the SPLC disagreed); 
Charlotte Allen, King of Fearmongers: Morris Dees and the Southern Poverty Law Center. Scaring 
donors since 1971, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, April 15, 2013, at 18. 
 152  For a discussion of the link between Obama and Alinsky, see Peter Dreier, Organizing in 
the Obama Era: A Progressive Moment or a New Progressive Era? 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 685 
(2009). 
 153  Two cases in particular highlight the antipathy of the Obama administration to religious 
freedom. In the first, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), the Court unanimously reversed an order of 
Sixth Circuit and EEOC, both supported by the Obama administration, that the EEOC, not religious 
officials, had the right to decide who qualifies as a minister; for a commentary on this case focusing 
on its application to higher education, see Charles J. Russo & Paul E. McGreal, Religious Freedom 
in American Catholic Higher Education, 39 RELIGION & EDUC. 116 (2012). In the second case, 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) the Justices rebuffed the administra-
tion’s attempt to impose the contraceptives mandate in the Affordable Health Care Act, commonly 
known as Obama Care, to a for-profit closely held corporation, reasoning that it was unconstitutional 
as a substantial burden on the owners’ free exercise of religion.  
 154  SAUL D. ALINSKY, RULES FOR RADICALS: A PRACTICAL PRIMER FOR REALISTIC 
RADICALS 128 (1971). 
 155  Certainly, absent a reasonable forecast of material and/or substantial disruption, language 
cited in the EAA, the fact that opponents disagree with an organization views is an insufficient basis 
on which to restrict groups that may be unpopular. See, e.g., East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. 
of Educ., 81 F. Supp.2d 1166, 1197–98 (D. Utah 1999); Straights and Gays for Equality v. Osseo 
Area Schs., 540 F.3d 911, 915–16 (8th Cir. 2008) (allowing clubs consisting of students who are 
straight and gay to meet in public schools during non-instructional hours). 
 156  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 637–38 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations 
omitted), disagreeing with  
[t]he Court’s notion that a student who simply sits in ‘respectful silence’ during the invocation 
and benediction (when all others are standing) has somehow joined—or would somehow be 
perceived as having joined—in the prayers is nothing short of ludicrous. . . .  [S]urely ‘our so-
cial conventions,’ have not coarsened to the point that anyone who does not stand on his chair 
and shout obscenities can reasonably be deemed to have assented to everything said in his pres-
ence. . . . It is fanciful enough to say that ‘a reasonable dissenter,’ standing head erect in a class 
of bowed heads, ‘could believe that the group exercise signified her own participation or ap-
proval of it.’ It is beyond the absurd to say that she could entertain such a belief while pointedly 
declining to rise.   
 157  See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Un-
ion Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 845 (1995); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001); for a related 
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In protecting peaceful speech, such as pro-life demonstrators159 who 
typically seek to protect the sanctity of life based on their religious be-
liefs,160 the Supreme Court has recognized that neither individuals nor 
groups may be discriminated against simply because others disagree with 
the content of their messages. If anything, consistent with Justice Scalia’s 
dissent in Lee,161 there are no better places than educational settings, 
whether K–12 or higher education, as the very places purportedly open to 
the pursuit of knowledge, to afford all sides opportunities to speak freely 
and without recrimination. Such settings provide genuine diversity of 
opinion in pursuit of knowledge and understanding. 
Of course, matters dealing with group identity and leadership quali-
fications present a different issue that ought to provide organizational 
leaders with freedom and self-determination so that they can operate as 
they deem fit, as long as they are acting consistent with their deeply held 
religious beliefs as in Martinez. Yet, recent examples of campus intoler-
ance toward religion abound as people of faith seek to preserve their 
identities in increasingly hostile environments. For instance, some reli-
gious institutions face the loss of accreditation if they fail to toe the line 
of progressive demands.162 The California state system163 and individual 
 
commentary, see Thomas B. McKernan III, Religious Clubs and Non-secondary Public Schools: 
Expanding the Scope of The Equal Access Act After Good News Club, 10 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 
14 (2009). 
 158  See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (affirming that insofar as the speech of 
church members who picketed near the funeral of a soldier who was killed in Iraq based on their 
desire to communicate their belief “that God hates and punishes the United States for its tolerance of 
homosexuality, particularly in America’s military” was of public concern, it was entitled to special 
protection under the First Amendment).   
 159  See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Care Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 754 (1994) (invalidating 
provisions of an injunction establishing a 36–foot buffer zone on private property, banning observa-
ble images, establishing a 300 foot no-approach zone around an abortion clinic, and establishing 
300–foot buffer zone around staff residences burdened peaceful speech more than necessary to serve 
governmental interests). 
 160  In re U.S. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming that a pro-
abortion group lacked standing to challenge the tax exempt status of the Roman Catholic Church 
based on its pro-life teachings). 
 161  Lee, 505 U.S. at 631–46.  
 162  See, e.g., Mary Moore, Accreditation board gives Gordon College a year to review policy 
on homosexuality, BOSTON BUS. J., Oct. 26, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 26828093. A similar 
situation occurred in British Columbia, Canada, involving Trinity Western Law School, Christian 
institution that was denied accreditation and may be unable to open on time due to its stance on same 
sex unions. See, e.g., Ian Mulgrew, Province rethinking Trinity Western law school, VANCOUVER 
SUN, Nov. 20, 2014 at A 11, available at 2014 WLNR 32621829. Initially, the school had been 
granted accreditation. Andrea Woo, Trinity Western law school approved in B.C. despite gay-rights 
dispute, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), April 11, 2014 (pagination unavailable online), available at 
2014 WLNR 9840784. 
 163  See, e.g., Andrew Walker, Intervaristy Christian Ministry in Trouble for Acting Chris-
tian, (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2014/09/intervarsity-christian-
ministry-in-trouble-for-acting-christian (reporting that the California State University System is 
withdrawing official recognition of the InterVarsity Christian Fellowship at its 23 campuses because 
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institutions of higher education threaten to discriminate against Christian 
groups due to their religious beliefs. At Tufts University, opponents at-
tempted to deprive a Christian group of its campus status because its 
rules require group leaders to adhere to “basic biblical truths of Christi-
anity” and reject gay lifestyles.164  While university officials subsequent-
ly reversed course and allowed faith-based student groups to retain the 
religious requirements for their leaders,165 similar controversies are likely 
to continue. Months earlier, fourteen out of thirty Christian groups at 
Vanderbilt University left campus over the same issue,166 prompting 
members of Congress to ask officials to exempt faith-based organizations 
from the institutional “all-comers policy” on the basis that it discrimi-
nates against religious beliefs.167 To date, the legislatures in Ohio,168 
Tennessee,169 and Virginia170 have taken the lead in protecting religious 
freedom by banning discrimination by officials in public institutions 
against faith-based student organizations.171 
The intolerance fomented on public campuses is consistent with Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s172 opinion in Martinez, reflective of the larger issue, as 
 
the organization limits leadership roles to those who affirm their belief in its traditional Christian 
Doctrinal Basis, available at http://intervarsity.org/about/our/our-doctrinal-basis). See also Sarah 
Eekhoff Zylstra, Will InterVarsity Losing Cal State Standoff Be Tipping Point for Campus Ministries Nation-
wide? America’s largest university system withdraws recognition from 23 student groups for not allowing 
non-Christian leaders, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Sept. 8, 2014), 
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2014/september-web-only/will-intervarsity-losing-cal-state-
standoff-be-tipping-poin.html?utm_source=ctdirect-
html&utm_medium=Newsletter&utm_term=9504661&utm_content=299683109&utm_campaign=2
013. 
 164  See Katherine Landergan, Group of Evangelicals at Tufts Fights a ‘De-recognizing’ Ef-
fort, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 27, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 22802278 (reporting on efforts 
to de-recognize an evangelical student group because opponents objected to its religious views).  
 165  Peter Schworm, Tufts Shifts Course, Grants More Leeway to Student Religious Groups, 
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 7, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 26033344. 
 166  Andy Sher, Social Issues Stole the Spotlight This Year in the Tennessee Legislature, 
CHATTANOOGA TIMES, May 6, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 9587648. 
 167  Elizabeth Bewley, Members of Congress Target Vanderbilt Policy, TENNESSEAN, May 8, 
2012, available at 2012 WLNR 9663350 (noting that the legislature of Virginia enacted a law de-
signed to ban all-comers policies, allowing campus groups to grant membership only to those who 
share their beliefs and missions). 
 168  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3345.023 (2011) (religious student group benefits). 
 169  TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1805 (2014) (religious student groups; access to school facili-
ties).  
 170  VA. CODE ANN. § 23-9.2:12 (2013) (student organizations; rights and recognition). See 
also Va. Passes Ban on Campus ‘All-Comers’ Policy, CBN NEWS (Feb. 26, 2013), 
http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2013/February/Va-Passes-Ban-on-Campus-All-Comers-Policy/ 
(noting that Virginia’s legislature enacted a law designed to ban all-comers policies, allowing cam-
pus groups to grant membership only to those who share their beliefs and missions). 
 171  For a news story on this issue, see Harry Painter, The Supreme Court endangered Chris-
tian student groups, but some states are coming to the rescue, POPE CENTER (Oct. 1, 2014), 
http://www.popecenter.org/commentaries/article.html?id =3077#.VFVEYfnF93U. 
 172  For a more detailed critique of Ginsburg’s position, see GREG LUKIANOFF, UNLEARNING 
LIBERTY: CAMPUS CENSORSHIP AND THE END OF AMERICAN DEBATE (2012) (detailing how the cul-
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she blithely ignored the fact that more than sixty campus RSOs existed at 
Hastings, many of which “were and are dedicated to expressing a mes-
sage.”173 Yet, as pointed out in Justice Alito’s dissent, Justice Ginsburg 
joined Hastings officials in misrepresenting the position of the Society, 
claiming that all RSOs were obligated to accept all comers. Yet, CLS 
was “the only student group whose application for registration has ever 
been rejected.”174 
Equally disappointing was Justice Ginsburg’s summary dismissal of 
CLS’s fears that individuals hostile to its mission might engage in what 
was described as a hostile takeover. Ginsburg wrote that this possibility 
was “more hypothetical than real,”175 because no such efforts had been 
made to date with religious groups.176 In allowing a Christian organiza-
tion to be singled out for ostracism, Justice Ginsburg and the Court did 
not even deem it appropriate to consider the fears of the group that was 
subject to a rule that was not imposed on any other RSO, or perhaps sug-
gest that opponents were free to form their own organizations in which 
they were free to establish their own membership guidelines. 
At the same time, an argument can be made that seeking to require 
religious groups, Christian or other, to accept possible leaders who do 
not share their values may well be a form of compelled speech177 (and as-
sociation) by allowing a lower court ruling hostile to a Christian photog-
rapher to stand. Such anomalous situations can occur by obligating or-
ganizations to accept individuals with whom they have little or nothing 
in common for no logical purpose other than meeting some vague notion 
of being open to “all comers.” Where such a policy is selectively applied, 
the constitutional problems are compounded. In this regard, how much 
sense would it make to direct members of a college Democrat Club to 
have to elect a Republican as its leader or to obligate an LGBT group to 
have a neo-Nazi at its helm? Clearly, because it would make no sense to 
dictate such an outcome, why impose one on Christian groups? 
 
ture of censorship present on most campuses has resulted in the failure of institutions of higher learn-
ing to promote critical thinking in students). 
 173  Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 706 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 174  Id.  
 175  Id. at 692. 
 176  Such takeovers have occurred, however, in non-religious group cases such as the Young 
Republicans taking over the Young Democrats. Leaving Religious Students Speechless: Public Uni-
versity Antidiscrimination Policies and Religious Student Organizations, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2882, 
2885 n.20 (2005). 
 177  The Supreme Court refused to intervene in a case alleging compelled speech n the brief 
filed by the petitioners in Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d. 53, 80 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014) (requiring Christian photographers to offer their services to a lesbian couple 
entering a same sex union). Elane Photography, LLC’S Petition for Writ of Certiorari Pursuant to 
Rule 12-502 NMRA , 2012 WL 3923883 at *5 (N.M.) (Appellate Brief). 
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What the courts have thus far refused to address, let alone answer, is 
why Christian groups must be singled out to ignore their deeply held re-
ligious beliefs under the guise of “tolerance” and “openness” when, in 
practice, this turns out to be a one-sided request? Why is it that so-called 
progressives are unwilling to allow those with whom they disagree to 
“live and let live”? 
In an example full of unintentional irony, the concurring opinion in a 
judgment directing a Christian photographer to take pictures at a same 
sex union wrote that 
the [plaintiffs] have to channel their conduct, not their beliefs, so as to 
leave space for other Americans who believe something different. That 
compromise is part of the glue that holds us together as a nation, the 
tolerance that lubricates the varied moving parts of us as a people. That 
sense of respect we owe others, whether or not we believe as they 
do . . . In short, I would say to the Huguenins, with the utmost respect: 
it is the price of citizenship.178 
Where is this very same tolerance for Christians?179 While conceding 
that this case was not directly involving schools, why are individuals 
whose values differ from those of Christians seeking forced accommoda-
tions when undoubtedly others would be able to offer their professional 
services? More to the point, will school officials soon be treating reli-
gious clubs and students as pariahs if they do not pledge allegiance to the 
politically correct ideologies of the day? Can it be that the free exercise 
of religion is doomed in public educational institutions? Would it not be 
better for those opposed to Christian groups to form their own clubs in 
order to share their values or join in and participate peacefully rather than 
seek to disrupt? 
This article neither calls for nor supports the notion that religious 
groups should be permitted to engage in self-segregating practices by 
limiting membership to those who are like-minded. Certainly, in an open 
society, all must have the option of joining the organizations of their 
choice even if they are ineligible to serve as leaders. Yet, it is unclear 
why campus officials and progressives seek to bludgeon religious groups 
into submission by seeking Martinez to prevent them from engaging in 
 
 178  Id. at 80 (Bosson, J., concurring).  
 179  While conceding that such protesters represent a fringe minority and constitute particular-
ly egregious examples of disrespect for Christian, specifically Roman Catholic, beliefs and sensitivi-
ties, it is still important to note that the following incident occurred. On December 10, 1989 mem-
bers of the AIDS-awareness group ACT-UP chained themselves to pews in St. Patrick’s Cathedral 
and shouted down Cardinal O’Connor at a Sunday Mass before others pretending to “receive” the 
Eucharist spat it out, desecrating the Sacrament by stepping on the consecrated hosts. Mike Dorning, 
Religion, Gays, Politics Turn Parade Into Battle, CHI. TRIB. 1 (Mar. 15, 1993), available at 1993 
WLNR 4062014.   
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self-determination when selecting leaders. 
The Second Circuit, in an Equal Access Act involving high school 
students in New York discussed earlier,180 although arguably of dubious 
precedent post-Martinez, offered cogent food for thought. The court 
ruled that high school students retained the right to select leaders who 
complied with their club’s religious standards, thereby respecting the 
members’ right to religious freedom. Moreover, the court’s reasoning 
implies/suggests that those who disagreed with the group’s beliefs were 
free to form their own organization or clubs. It is perplexing to say that 
such thinking is not taking place in educational institutions of higher 
learning. As cynical as it may seem, it could be that such opponents are 
more concerned with their desire to assert their will over those with 
whom they disagree rather than actually becoming active members of or-
ganizations with which they share little in common. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is imperative for educational institutions in the United States to 
remain open to the notion of a world in which all points of view are wel-
come. Restricting the presence of competing ideals even where individu-
als and groups maintain respectful differences, disagreeing with one an-
other without being disagreeable, contradicts the very nature of education 
in a free and democratic society. It is thus unclear why progressive pro-
ponents of the school and campus orthodoxies of the day should be 
granted free rein to shut down those with whom they disagree, more of-
ten than not using a heckler’s veto181 to drown out or exclude religious 
perspectives that have long been welcomed and granted equal access as 
an essential voice in the American public square. 
As former President Dwight Eisenhower presciently observed, we 
must remain aware of differing points of view: “the virtues of our system 
will never be fully appreciated by us and our children unless we under-
stand the essentials of opposing ideologies.”182 Yet, as American educa-
tional institutions face the future, particularly after Martinez, the outlook 
for religious freedom could be less than bright if the unwillingness of 
some to respect the long and sincerely held religious beliefs of others 
grows into a general tend. If the United States is to remain true to its 
 
 180  Hsu, 85 F.3d at 839. 
 181  See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (permitting a religious group to use public school facilities). Justice Thomas made this point 
in warning that the Court is unwilling “to employ Establishment Clause jurisprudence using a modi-
fied heckler’s veto, in which a group’s religious activity can be proscribed on the basis of what . . . 
members of the audience might misperceive.” 
 182  TRAVIS BEAL JACOBS, EISENHOWER AT COLUMBIA 97 (2001). 
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founding principles enshrined in the Bill of Rights, then all interested in 
preserving the rights of believers to express their views openly in educa-
tional settings (and elsewhere) must step to the fore to allow people of 
faith to continue to live and let live in the public marketplace of ideas. 
 
